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SWATSTIKA POLICING 
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Wilkes, “Explosive Dynamic Entry,” Flagpole Magazine, p. 8  (July 30, 2003). 
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Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America 
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       “These elite [police SWAT] units are highly culturally appealing to certain sections of the 
police community.  They like it.  They enjoy it.  The chance to strap on a vest, grab a semi-
automatic weapon and go out on a mission is for some people an exciting reason to join.  The 
problem is that when you talk about the war on this, and the war on that, and police officers see 
themselves as soldiers, then the civilian becomes the enemy.”–Prof. Peter B. Kraska 
 
       “Polite, Professional, and Prepared to Kill”–Title of article by Chris Barfield published in 
SWAT Magazine in December 2005 
 
       “Power is a heady thing.”–Justice William O. Douglas 
 
At 9:35 p.m. on Tuesday, Jan. 24, 2006, in Fairfax county, Virginia, a police SWAT 
team, armed to the teeth, decked out in battle fatigues, helmets, flak vests, and other 
military accouterments, arrived at the townhouse of Dr. Salvatore J. Culosi, Jr., a 37-
year old optometrist.  Culosi was a suspected bookie who had been making illegal 
sports bets from his home, and Fairfax police had obtained a warrant for his arrest and 
a search warrant to search his residence for gambling paraphernalia.   Culosi had no 
history of violent behavior and his alleged crimes were nondangerous, but the practice 
in Fairfax county is for the local SWAT team to serve almost all search warrants.  The 
unarmed, unresisting  Culosi was in front of his residence when they arrived, weapons 
drawn in accordance with police protocol.  As they began encircling Culosi, one of the 
officers, apparently accidentally, fired his large .45 cal. Heckler & Koch handgun, 
striking Culosi in the chest and killing him instantly.   Predictably, the fearsome, 
fascistic trend towards militarizing American police by, among other things, 
transforming the serving of warrants into paramilitary commando operations, had 
resulted once again in lethal police violence and the unjustified death of an American 
citizen. 
 
In Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids, published in July, Radley Balko, a 
news columnist and policy analyst, gives us an authoritative nonscholarly overview of 
what BBC newsman Matthew Davis calls the “explosion in the use of military-style 
police SWAT teams in the United States.”  “Over the past 25 years,” Balko explains, 
“America has seen a disturbing militarization of its civilian law enforcement, along 
with a dramatic and unsettling rise in the use of paramilitary police units (commonly 
called Special Weapons and Tactics, or SWAT) for routine police work.  The most 
common use of SWAT teams today is to serve narcotics warrants, usually with forced, 
unannounced entry into the home.”  Balko continues: 
 
    These increasingly frequent raids, 40,000 per year by one estimate, are needlessly subjecting 
nonviolent drug offenders, bystanders, and wrongly targeted civilians to the terror of having their 
homes invaded while they are sleeping, usually by teams of heavily armed paramilitary units 
dressed not as police officers but as soldiers.  These raids bring unnecessary violence and 
provocation to nonviolent drug offenders, many of whom were guilty only of 
misdemeanors.  The raids terrorize innocents when police mistakenly target the wrong 
residence.  And they have resulted in dozens of needless deaths and injuries, not only of drug 
offenders, but also of police officers, children, bystanders, and innocent suspects. 
 
Crimes statistics put out by law enforcement or other government agencies studiously 
omit information about crimes or acts of violence or improprieties committed by 
police against citizens.  Furthermore, police departments apparently do not keep and 
at any rate certainly do not release to the public statistics on the activities of their 
SWAT teams unless those statistics reflect favorably on those teams.  There are, for 
example, no official statistics on how many SWAT raids are “wrong address” raids, or 
on how many people SWAT police shoot or kill or injure or how frequently they 
discharge their weapons or how much property damage they inflict.  Although he 
freely acknowledges that his investigation is incomplete, Balko has, after tireless 
research and consultation with scholars, compiled reliable, desperately needed 
statistics and other vital information about American police paramilitarism not 
available from official sources. 
 
Here are a few of the causes for alarm documented in Balko’s book and the sources he 
cites: 
 
    ■Since 1995, there have been at least 292 botched SWAT raids–where, for 
example, an innocent person or nonviolent offender was killed or there was a “wrong 
address” raid. 
 
    ■Since 1995, SWAT raids have resulted in the deaths of at least 40 innocent 
persons and 20 nonviolent offenders, and in the death or injury of 22 police officers. 
 
    ■Since 1995, there have been at least 143 SWAT raids on innocent suspects. 
 
    ■In the 1980s there were about 3,000 SWAT team deployments annually across the 
country; by 1996, there were 30,000 per year; and currently, there are about 40,000 a 
year. 
 
    ■Each day in this country, SWAT units raid more than 100 homes. 
 
    ■SWAT raids are usually conducted “very late at night or very early in the 
morning.” 
 
    ■SWAT raids of residences usually involve so-called no-knock entry, which means 
that officers force entry without first giving the  occupants notice of their presence and 
purpose and an opportunity to answer the door.  (The police euphemism for this 
common practice of battering down doors or breaking windows to effect entry without 
first giving the residents a chance to open the door is “dynamic entry.”) 
 
    ■Increasingly, SWAT raids involve “explosive dynamic entry,” which means that, 
after breaking down the door or smashing in a window, but before entering, police 
detonate stun grenades in the residence.  (My article Explosive Dynamic Entry, which 
appeared in Flagpole Magazine on July 30, 2003, examined the increasingly frequent 
practice of American police units, almost always militarized SWAT teams, to use 
explosive devices when making unannounced entries into residences. Without 
attempting to be comprehensive, it also summarized the factual scenarios of 39 
incidents between 1984 and 2003 when explosive dynamic entry occurred and in the 
course of which a total of four innocent persons were killed and other innocent 
persons, including pregnant women and infants, injured.  That article is quoted from 
and cited in Overkill.) 
 
    ■It is not uncommon for SWAT police to wear hoods or masks. 
 
    ■It is standard practice for members of a SWAT team carrying out a raid to keep 
their weapons drawn and to point them at suspects or alleged suspects. 
 
    ■After forcing their way into the residence, it is standard practice for SWAT 
officers to bark out orders to occupants and force them at gunpoint to “prone 
out.”  Noncompliance with these orders is typically met with force, sometimes deadly 
force.  Occupants are automatically handcuffed with their hands behind them and kept 
face-down on the floor. 
 
    ■Once confined to situations involving acts of terrorism, hostage-takings, 
hijackings, and other emergencies, in many jurisdictions SWAT units are now 
deployed routinely in ordinary police work.  In some jurisdictions they serve all drug 
warrants, including misdemeanor cases; in other jurisdictions they serve practically all 
warrants.  Frequently they engage in routine police patrolling.  “SWAT teams,” Balko 
drily states, “are now being used to respond even to calls about angry dogs and 
domestic disputes.” 
 
    ■Steeped in the military mind set, trained to be confrontational, and eager to 
engage in overwhelming shows of force, SWAT units have an organizational culture 
that leads them to escalate situations rather than de-escalate them; far from defusing 
violent situations, most SWAT raids actually create them.  SWAT units increase, 
rather than decrease, police violence. 
 
    ■Increasingly, SWAT teams are being renamed to sugarcoat their image, e.g., 
Strategic Operations Group, Emergency Services Unit, Special Emergency Response 
Team, or Tactical Apprehension Containment Team.  (Members of SWAT teams call 
themselves tactical officers.  If you want to get a better idea of the mentality of these 
commando cops and see just how pervasive and numerous SWAT units are in our 
criminal justice system, just Google “tactical officers association.”  In particular, take 
a look at the website of the Georgia Tactical Officers Association, 
www.gatactical.com.) 
 
    ■There is no possibility that the federal courts, at least as presently constituted, will 
meaningfully protect citizens from SWAT team excesses.  Indeed, stacked as they are 
with right-wing, pro-state majoritarians, many of them ex-prosecutors or ex-
government lawyers, these courts have been downright hostile to most claims that 
police conduct violated Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  Although constitutional law, statutory law, and the common law 
generally prohibit no-knock entries into residences by police executing a search 
warrant and require them instead to afford the residents an opportunity to open the 
door peacefully, the knock-and-announce requirement has been so watered down and 
so riddled with exceptions by the federal courts that it is now virtually 
meaningless.  (In U.S. v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003), for example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that police did not violate the knock-and-announce requirement when they 
waited only 15 to 20 seconds after knocking before forcibly entering the defendant’s 
two-room apartment to execute a search warrant.)  The traditional legal requirement 
that police usually afford the inhabitants of a home an opportunity to answer the 
knock at the door before police violently enter has become, therefore, in the words of 
legal scholar E. Martin Estrada, “a toothless tiger in the constitutional jungle.”  As a 
result, the great majority of warrant-based home searches, especially those made by 
SWAT units, involve no-knock entry.  Such entry, which is supposed to be the 
exception, has become the rule.  Compounding the problem, on June 15 of this year, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which tragically nowadays is unperturbed by lawlessness in 
law enforcement and views itself as a footsoldier in the war on drugs and crime and a 
cheerleader for the police rather than a guardian of the basic rights of Americans, 
startlingly overruled precedents and held by a 5-4 vote in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 
S.Ct. 2159 (2006), that when police do violate the Fourth Amendment in effecting no-
knock entry into a home to serve a search warrant, the evidence obtained inside will 
no longer be inadmissible in court.  In his creepily pro-government opinion for the 
majority, Justice Scalia sank so low as to label a clear Fourth Amendment violation 
and police state-type outrage–police bursting into a residence in violation of the ban 
on no-knock entry–as “a preliminary misstep”!  Furthermore, technical and procedural 
rules erected by the U.S. Supreme Court have made it very difficult and time-
consuming to sue the police successfully for violating citizens’ rights.  Federal civil 
actions for damages against SWAT officers are therefore usually unsuccessful, and 
the majority of such actions are dismissed prior to trial. 
 
    ■Criminal prosecutions of SWAT officers who exceed their lawful powers in the 
use of deadly or nondeadly force are extremely rare, and convictions of such officers 
are practically unheard of.   Fairfax county, Virginia prosecutors, for example, 
declined to bring charges against the officer who killed Dr. Culosi even though tests 
showed no defect in the officer’s handgun.  
 
In addition to cataloging the facts concerning the shockingly large number of 
mistaken raids and horrifying abuses committed by SWAT units, Overkill makes a 
number of sensible recommendations for reform (such as returning SWAT units to 
their original and only legitimate function–“defusing those rare, emergency situations 
in which a suspect presents an immediate threat to someone’s life or safety”). 
 
Even if you decide not to purchase Overkill, you might want to look at the interactive 
map, “Botched Paramilitary Police Raids: An Epidemic of ‘Isolated Incidents,’” 
prepared by Balko in conjunction with the release of his book.  It may be accessed at 
www.cato.org/raidmap/index.php. 
 
On the other hand, if after reading Overkill you crave more bad news about the spine-
chilling signs that America is steadily turning itself into a police state, you might pick 
up a copy of the leading scholarly treatise on the militarization of police in this 
country: Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of 
the Armed Forces and the Police, published in 2001 by Northeastern University Press, 
and edited by Peter B. Kraska, a professor at Eastern Kentucky University. 
     
As the United States of America glides down the path of the Third Reich, as American 
police strain to emulate the Gestapo, it is impossible to disagree with Van Jones, 
Executive Director of the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, who writes: “If this 
were happening in any other country in the world, this incredible militarization of the 
police, the incredible expansion of police power, [and] the increase in police 
weaponry ... we’d be screaming.” 
